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Tuesday, October 26, 2010

The Thirst of the Soul

"Hasidic thought views philosophy and philosophers with an apathy verging on invalidation. The faith of philosophers rests upon the astute answer that they give to resolve some paradox that they themselves created. But contentment with some "answer" only stultifies the longing soul, which yearns daily for a more profound thirst and for ever-increasing fulfillment...The thirst becomes enclothed in philosophical questions, in the desire to understand a certain point. That philosophical quest is thus merely one of the vessels in which the soul's thirst takes on a form, because the ultimate thirst of the soul is still hidden from consciousness. But if a person were able to visualize what he really seeks, his mind would already have grasped it, and attaining it attaining it would then be within reach. However, since he is not yet ready to grasp this ultimate truth in his mind, his thirst must now express itself in some interim form in some desire to which the soul can presently relate...The person who relishes in resolving some philosophical question is just like that wounded child [who is pacified with candy]. His soul is only temporarily pacified, but he has not quenched his soul's ongoing thirst. For the thirst of the soul is to return to its Source...step by step...without too much tarrying at each step, for each step brings the soul closer..."
-R. Menachem Ekstein, H"YD, Tannai ha'Nefesh 'Hasagat ha'Chaddisut (Translated as Visions of a Compassionate World by Yehoshua Starrett)

"It is only possible to find a secure basis for the soul in the context of God. Knowledge, feeling, imagination, desire, and the inner and outer movements of the soul all require of Man that they be Godly. Then they will find their full expression, their proper relations, with a settled mind. However, if a person searches for greatness just below this level, then immediately he is like a lost ship in the sea; battling waves constantly remove rest from him, and from wave to wave he is taken in confusion. If it is possible for him to become stuck in any thick mud of an insensitive soul and heart, he will be successful in limiting the light of his life for a while until it seems like he has finally found rest. But this will not prevail for long; the soul will break through its prison and the unstable confusion will be at its full strength. The place of our rest is only to be found in God."
-R. Kook, Orot, Zironim, Tzima'on l'El Chai (See R. Haim Lifshitz here and here for his analogy of G0d as the appex of a triangle)

"The history of philosophy exhibits man's search for Truth by the way of discursive reasoning. A Neo-Thomist...has maintained that the judgement always points beyond itself, always contains an implicit reference to Absolute Truth...[W]e may say that the search for truth is ultimately the search for Absolute Truth, God, and even those systems of philosophywhich appear to refute this statement, e.g. Historical Materialism, are nevertheless examples of it, for they are all seeking, even if unconsciously, even if they would not recognize the fact, for the ultimate Ground, the supremely Real."
-Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, pg. 6

"In My Father, Bertrand Russell, his daughter Katharine Tait, writes 'I would have liked to convince my father that I had found what he had been looking for, the ineffable something he had longed for all his life. I would have liked to persuade him that the search for God does not have to be in vain. But it was hopeless...' Tait, nevertheless, believes that Russell's 'whole life had been a search for God...Somewhere in the back of my father's mind, at the bottom of his heart, in the depths of his soul, there was an empty space that had once been filled by God, and he never found anything else to put in it.' He had 'the ghost like feeling of not belonging, of having no home in this world.' In a poignant passage Russell once said: ''Nothing can penetrate the loneliness of the human heart except the highest intensity of the sort of love the religious teachers have preached.'"



Thursday, October 21, 2010

Categories of the Oral Law - Part I

We have previously discussed the purpose of an Oral Torah and some arguments in favor of the reliability of the Oral Torah. Before we turn to understanding the philosophy of the Oral Torah, I will now briefly deliniate it's categories.

Halakha l'Moshe m'Sinai

Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai are laws or explanations of laws which, as the name suggests, were given to Moshe and are only known through tradition; as the Rambam in Hakdma l'Peirush ha'Mishnayot makes clear there is no source for Halakhot l'Moshe m'Sinai in the Written Torah. However, the Megillat Esther on Sefer Ha’Mitzvot, shoresh aleph (see Encyclopedia Talmudit pg. 366), distinguishes between a “remez galuy” [a clear hint in a verse] and a “remez b’nistar” [a masked hint in a verse]. A Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai can have the latter. It may be possible to bring a remez from Nakh for a Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai (see Moed Katan 5a). Sometimes the Talmud will give an asmachta – a supporting verse – for a Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai. This asmachta can also come from Nakh.

The Maharatz Chayes (Mevo l'Talmud) points out that a Halakha l’Moshe m’Sinai can either provide the details for laws found in the Torah or be the sole source for a law (for example, Sukkah 44b, Sanhedrin 81b or Nazir 4:6).

The Rambam counts about thirty-three instances of Halakhot l’Moshe M’Sinai. Interestingly, Chanoch Albeck writes that there are only three times in the Mishna that it appears – Peah 2:6; Edeyot 8:7; and Yadayim 4:3. Sometimes, however, the Talmud uses the term Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai imprecisely; it applies this term to certain rabbinic laws. The Rash in Yadayim 4:3 explains that it means Halakha K’Moshe M’Sinai, it is as clear as if given at Sinai (see Tos, Yom Tov in Yoma perek bet, siman yud bet; the Rash, Rosh, Bartenura, Turei Even in Chagiga 3:2; Pesachim 110b; Rosh at the end of Nidda; the R”I in Hikhot Mikvaot, siman aleph). R. Soloveitchik (Shiurim l’zecher Abba Mori, Mesorah) interprets Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai, presumably only in these cases, to mean that the halakha was received without any reason given, just like a real Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai.

The Talmud states in many places that certain Halakhot l’Moshe M’Sinai were forgotten and later reconstituted (usually by the prophets). There is an opinion that these halakhot in their reconstituted state lost their status as a Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai (Marahap, Shabbat 1:4).

A point of considerable controversy is the Rambam's statement (Hakdama l’Peirush ha'Mishnayot) that Halakhot l'Moshe m'Sinai are not subject to disagreement. See Encyclopedia Talmudit, pg. 370 for a list of Rishonim/Achronim who seem to hold like this. This opinion is difficult for the following reasons:

A) The Ramban on Sefer haMitzvot (shoresh aleph), and Chavot Yair point out that there are many instances where there is disagreement regarding a Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai (For example, see Temurah 15a-16a). In fact, the Chavot Yair lists eight instances of disagreement out of the Rambam’s own list of thirty-three! Furthermore, he lists fifty Halakhot l’Moshe m’Sinai that the Rambam did not list which are subject to disagreement. In fact, the Rambam himself mentions a Halakha l’Moshe m’Sinai that was forgotten due to the “many years that passed and many exiles” – the instructions for correctly sounding the Shofar (Hilkhot Shofar 3:2; also see the Ran on Rosh Hashana 34a).

B) The aggadita discusses the pervasiveness of forgetfulness (even by Moshe himself!). It is likely that forgetfulness is inherent in the transmission of an oral tradition, especially under oppression and exile.

C) R. Zvi Lampel (Dynamics of Dispute) points it this way: the origin of a law does not affect its remembrance. Why should telling the people that a certain law had been explicated by Hashem and is without any supporting verse in the Torah make them less liable to forget it than had the law come through a hermenutical principle? Furthermore he asks “Is it reasonable to construct a scenario…that even though a law is remembered, its origin could have become obscure, none knowing for certain if it had originated as a law told to Moshe at Sinai, or as a rabbinical law, or as the result of a drash?” The Dor Revi”i (Hakdma l'Chullin) asks a similar question: Just because we haven’t found dissenting opinions in regard to a Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai that does not mean that there were never any dissenting opinions!

A common approach in defending the Rambam is to state that that Rambam holds that there can be arguments over minute details of a Halakha l’Moshe M’Sinai but there will never be a case where one says “permissible” and the other says “forbidden.” There is no disagreement about matters of fundamental importance. See Aurch ha’Schulkhan on Hilkhot Mamrim, 64. R. Zvi Lampel argues that this answer is too vague for what constitutes a major or minor issue?

Maharatz Chayos (Torat HaNevi’im, as developed by R. Zvi Lampel) defends the Rambam by reversing our understanding of what the Rambam said. He did not mean that the “Sinaitic laws remained extant and clear because they were basic, but the reverse: Simply that those Sinaitic teachings that happened to remain extant, precisely because they were known to be extant Sinaitic teachings, stood as the uncontested prime material to be subject only to analysis and analytical debate and not challenge.” When the Rambam says “eyn bo makhloket” he means that no Sage contested any laws that were known to have originated with Moshe, not that there are
no Sages who disagreed about such laws. The Rambam in Peirush ha’Mishnayot (Edeyot 8:7) seems to say this excplicitly. The Rambam was reacting to the Karaite challenge that the existence of disagreement demonstrates that there is no Oral Law transmitted from Sinai. The Rambam responded that indeed there is disagreement, even about Halakhot l’Moshe m’Sinai but all agree that it is a Halakha l’Moshe m’Sinai!

Hyper-dimensional Consciousness

"I wish to describe to you how powerful is my desire to rejoice with you and to cause you to rejoice at your simchah. I do not exaggerate when I tell you how many years I have waited and longed for this moment and how many times I have pictured in my mind's eye how I would dance in front of you at your wedding. But, "Many are the thoughts of men..." (Mishlei 19:21). This too is no doubt also for the good. But know, my dear friend, that only my three-dimensional body, bound by the contraints of time and space, will not be with you. My soul, unconstrained by distance and above all time and space, the true "I," which is joined to you with all of its might, will have a large share in your simchah."

- Reb Shraga Feivel Mendelovitz, 1886-1948 (quoted in Moshe Bamberger, Great Jewish Letters, pg. 203)

"Our holy Torah places emphasis upon knowing and understanding the numerous worlds that exist, including this world and the World to Come, and the concepts of life and death. Once we believe in the absolute Oneness of G-d and of His name - which is the very essence of our Torah and our sacred faith - then there cannot be any division whatsoever between the worlds, between this world and the Coming World, and between life and death...

"I have recently seen the comments of the holy Ohr ha'Chaim, who explains that death should be understood as simply moving from one city to another (Leviticus 26:3). This is the whole truth. Your father, may his memory be blessed, has not died; he is alive. He has merely moved. To the understanding person there is even more to say. The deceased is now even closer to you than before, for now there are no separations. He is alive! He is now nearby and with us at all times. We must think in these terms and remember him, lest we forget him by considering him to be gone - G-d forbid."

- Reb Yerucham Levovitz, 1874-1936 (quoted in Moshe Bamberger, Great Jewish Letters, pg. 260)

Comment:

See Derashot ha'Ran, Derush Shvi'i; Shiure Da'at, Chayei Olamot, and Saul-Paul Sirag's Consciousness and Hyperspace.

Thursday, October 7, 2010

The Existence of the Oral Torah II

In the previous post arguments from Tanakh were presented for the existence of an Oral Torah and the reliability of the Oral Torah in our possession. In this post we will discuss three more arguments from the Mishna, Septuigent, Apocrypha, and historical research.

Arguments from the Mishna

R. David Nietto (Matteh Dan) argues that the Mishna was completely and immediately accepted by the Jewish people in different lands, as if its basic content was already familiar to them. Israel and Babylonia were divided by the Euphrates (Israel being a part of the Roman empire and Babylonia not). Rav brought the Mishna to Babylonia but there had been scholars in existence from the time of Hillel (Pesachim 66a, BK 117b). It is difficult to imagine the acceptance of unfamiliar traditions if that is, after all, what the Mishna represented. See Peirush la’Mishnayot Menachot 4:1 and Chiddushei Chatam Sofer Gitten 78a.

He further argues (along with R. D. Z. Hoffman, C. Albeck, and others) that the Mishna’s structure and style assumes that its readers already know basic concepts, leaving its authors to record details rather than principles. There must have existed a “First Mishna” long before R. Yehuda ha’Nasi. See Iggeret R. Sherira Gaon.

Arguments from the Septuigent

The Septuagint (3rd century B.C.E. Greek translation of the Torah) explains many laws of the Torah in accordance with rabbinic law. Sometimes it translates the verse in accordance with an opinion found in the Talmud that we do not follow and sometimes it goes according to an opinion not found in any rabbinic literature (but sometimes it is found in the Dead Sea Scrolls).

The following are examples of when the Septuigent agrees with the accepted halakha: a) Shemot 12:15 and Pesachim 5a, b) Shemot 21:7 and Mekhilta there [also see the other Greek translations and Targum-Yonasan; then see Ibn Ezra and Rashbam],c) Shemot 21:16 (see Devarim 24:7 and Sanhedrin 85b), d) Vayikra 21:5 (Devarim 14:1 and Makkos 20a), e) it translates “mi’macharat ha’Shabbat” as “after the first day of Yom Tov” (see above), f) Devarim 22:18 (see Ketubot 46a), g) Devarim 25:5 (see BB 115a), h) Devarim 26:12 (see RH 12b)

The following are examples of when the Septuigent agrees with one Tanna: a) Shemot 21:10 (see Mekhilta there or Ketubot 47b), b) Shemot 21:28-29, 35-36 (see BK 4:9), c) Shemot 22:12 (see Mekhilta there), d) Vayikra 22:28 (see Chullin 78b and the Ibn Ezra), e) Bamidbar 6:4 (see Nazir 6:2), f) Devarim 21:12 (see Yevamot 48a). This doesn’t mean that the Septuagint’s interpretation is older and more authoritative than the other Tanna’s since the verse is open to different interpretations and the Septuagint chose one over the other. It is eminently reasonable that the disagreements in the Talmud and Midrash halakha were much older than the Tannaim disagreeing. For example, in Sukkah 35a Ben Azzai reads “hadar” as water (as in, the “fruit that requires daily watering”) which is its meaning in the Greek language, hudor (think of English cognates, such as hydrate, hydrogen etc.). This is exactly how Aquilas translates it into Greek even though he wrote his translation according to the teachings of R. Akiva and R. Yishmael. Thus, this reading was widespread among the Tannaaim and not an innovation of Ben Azzai.

The following are examples of when the Septuigent translates against the halaka in part or in whole: a) Shemot 22:7, b) Shemot 21:22, c) Devarim 18:10, d) Bamidbar 5:17. Sometimes even the Targum Yonason goes against the halakha. See, for example, Vayikra 18:21 and Megillah 4:9 or Vayikra 22: 28 and Yerushalmi Berakhot 5:3. However, the Septuagint needs for further discussion because it sometimes changes the Masoretic Text or differs from it. Albeck says that most of the translaters weren’t Jewish and didn’t understand the Jewish religion or the Torah. Furthermore, much Tanaaitic material has been lost so it is possible that there were rabbinic opinions which were incorporated into the translations or the apocrypha. We know for sure that we lost the Mekhilta of R. Shimon and Sifrei Zuta because we have discovered fragments from them.

Arguments from the Apocrypha

The book of Ben Sira (2nd century) mentions shiva (but see B’reisheit 50:10), burying the dead, comforting mourners and visiting the sick, b) not swearing by G-d’s name freely, c) making a blessing (or perhaps just praising G-d) when seeing a rainbow, d) cleaning the weights (BB 5:8-11), e) to go to doctors when needed (Berakhot 60a, BK), f) he gives a description of Shimon b. Yochanan which is similar to Tamid 7:3. Much of the ethical advice found in Ben Sira has its parallels in rabbinic literature.

The Book of Macabees (2nd century B.C.E) mentions several halakhot: a) originally they would not fight on Shabbat until their enemies used this against them and Mattisyahu decreed that for self-protection they must fight. This halakha is also recorded in Josephus XII; b) they were in doubt about the stones of mizbeach which have become impure (see AZ 52b); c) in I Macabees 3 they have a fast which corresponds to Ta’anit 2:1 (also see MK 26a and I Macabees 4:38); d) they were careful not to pronounce the name of G-d or kinuyim (for example I Macabees 3:18 and see Sota 7:1); e) non-Jews would bring karbanot (II Macabees 3:35 and III Macabees 1:9, see Sifra Emor 7:2); f) it is possible to bring karban chatat as an atonement for the dead person’s sins (II Macabees 12:43 and Sifri Shoftim and Horiyot 6:1); g) I Macabees 12:38 mentions the ancient custom to bathe/purify one’s self before Shabbat; h) II Macabees 10:6-7 tells us that the Chashmonaim celebrated Channukah for eight days as a way to make up for their lost Sukkot. It describes how they fulfilled the mitzvah of Lulav which clarifies Nechemia 8:14 (unlike the Shomronim and Karaites).

The Book of Judith (dated to approximately the first century B.C.E.), says that she did not fast on Shabbat, Yom Tom or Rosh Chodesh nor on erev Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh (8:6). See RH 19a which agrees with this except that one is able to fast on erev Shabbat and Rosh Chodesh.

The book of Jubilees needs further investigation. In many areas it diverges from rabbinic halakha; in fact, it is often much more stringent For example, it is forbidden on Shabbat to leave [carry outside of?] the house, draw water, travel, do business, fast, make war, and have marital relations. The Book of Susan is similar to this – it is Biblically prohibited to ride on a horse on Shabbat. All of those who transgressed these laws were liable to the death penalty.

Arguments from Historical Research

Two of the most famous discoveries which indicate the existence of the Oral Torah are Mikva at Masada and Tefillin at Qumran which conform to Mishnaic definitions. Although other Tefillin were also found at Masada and Qumram which do not conform to Mishnaic definitions (see Torat ha’Moadim, pgs. 496-510 and Machanayim 62, pgs. 5-14). Either this represents secretarian views or the Halakha was not pinned down yet.

Another famous, but somewhat controversial, discovery is the alter on Mt. Ebal. Adam Zertal found this structure which probably is an alter dating to 1200 B.C.E. or so. He found that it conforms to the descriptions of alters in the Tanakh and in the Mishna in its basic and particular features (Middot 3:1-3; Zevahim 5:3 ). He maintains that this was the alter commanded in Devarim 27:1-9) and built by Yehoshua (8:30-32).

Two more interesting textual discoveries: Many laws found in the Mishna, which are not found in the written Torah, are very similar to other Ancient Near Eastern texts. For example, Ketubot 1:2 is also found in Sumerian law from the third millennium B.C.E. Also, many terms in the Mishna (Melog and Nikhsei Tzon Barzel) are also found in Akkadian from 1500 years before the Mishna. However, one could suggest that these legal terms were incorporated into rabbinic tradition later in time.

There is much more historical research to be discussed. For those interested, see Antiquities IV, XII, VIII, and XXIII, the Letter of Aristeas, and the literature on Philo and on the Dead Sea Scrolls.